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SITAL KALANTRY*
Abstract
Citizens of foreign countries are increasingly using international
treaties to assert claims against Federal and state governments. As a result,
U.S. courts are being asked to determine whether treaties provide litigants
with individually enforceable rights. Although courts have no consistent
approach to determining whether a treaty gives rise to individually
enforceable rights, they often apply the textualist methodology derived from
statutory interpretation. However, instead of using textual theories of statutory
interpretation, I argue that courts should use intentionalist theories developed
from contract interpretation in determining individually enforceable rights
under treaties. Two positive arguments and one negative argument support my
approach. First, the question of whether a non-party can enforce a treaty is
structurally similar to the question of whether a non-party can enforce a
contract, but structurally different from the issue of whether there is a private
cause of action under a statute. Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence
supports the view that treaties are contracts even though they have the effect of
statutes. As such, it is appropriate to apply theories of contract interpretation
to understanding treaties. Third, arguments used tojustify using textualism for
purposes of interpreting statutes are not relevant to interpreting treaties.
I suggest that courts use a modified version of the "intent-to-benefit"
test derived from contract law in determining whether a treaty is enforceable
by a non-party. Under the modified "intent-to-benefit" test, a non-party will
have individually enforceable rights and remedies under the treaty if the treaty
identifies a class of individuals who are intended beneficiaries of the treaty
and if such non-party is within that class of individuals. Applying this test
suggests that courts should privilege the drafting history over the ratification
history of a treaty in interpreting it.
I apply the modified "intent-to-benefit " test to a case study-the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Supreme Court recently
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decided in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations does not provide individuals with any remedies, but refused to decide
whether the treaty provides individuals with rights. Since that decision, two
Federal Courts of Appeals have come to differing conclusions on the question
of whether that treaty creates individually enforceable rights. Under the
modified "intent-to-benefit," the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
would be found to give rise to individually enforceable rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Globalization, marked by an increase in trade, migration, and capital
flows among nations, creates opportunities for disputes between national
governments and foreign nationals. International triburals, however, are not
typically receptive to claims brought by individual litigants for treaty
violations.' As a result, non-U.S. citizens are increasingly asserting claims in
U.S. courts based on treaty violations.' The efforts of the Executive in the war
against terrorism have also led non-U.S. citizens to assert claims under
international treaties.'
Although courts have generally recognized that treaties may give rise
to individually enforceable rights,' there is no consensus on the correct
methodology for adjudicating the issue. Yet many courts have increasingly
applied the textualist methodology that has become popular in statutory
interpretation to determining whether a treaty gives individuals rights.5 Courts
thus only look to the text of the treaty and typically refuse to use extra textual
sources to inform their decision.6 Courts that apply this methodology typically
disfavor finding individually enforceable rights in treaties.7 The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations ("Foreign Relations Restatement") concurs that
"[i]ntemational agreements.., generally do not create private rights or provide
for a private cause of action in domestic courts. '
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 906 (1987) ("International
tribunals and other fora are generally not open to claims by private persons."). But see GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 54, 124 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999) (noting that the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, as well as certain treaty monitoring bodies, allow
individuals to file petitions against nations acceding to their jurisdiction).
21 use the term "treaty" as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 [hereinafter Treaty Convention] ("'[T]reaty' means an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law ...."). My
use of "treaty" excludes "executive agreements," which may be concluded without the participation of
the Senate. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("A treaty signifies 'a
compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare.' But an
international compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate."
(quoting B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912)).
3 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
4 See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (enforcing a Yugoslav citizen's right under
U.S.-Serbia treaty to inherit personal property located in Oregon); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)
(enforcing a German citizens' right to inherit property in California); Bacardi Corp. of America v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940) (enforcing foreign trademark owner's rights under Pan-American
Trade-Mark Treaty); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) (enforcing a Danish citizen's right under
U.S.-Denmark treaty to be free of discriminatory taxation); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928)
(enforcing U.S.-Japan treaty allowing Japanese citizens to conduct trade in the United States); Cheung
Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336 (1925) (holding that U.S.-China treaty prevented mandatory
exclusion of wives and minor children of Chinese merchants under Immigration Act of 1924);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (enforcing treaty assuring Swiss citizens' right to inherit
property in Virginia); Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824) (enforcing British land
owner's rights under treaty of 1794); Soc'y for Propagation of Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New-Haven,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823) (same).
5 See discussion infra Part II.
6 See id.
7 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907 cmt. a. (1987).
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This article argues that a modified version of the "intent-to-benefit"
test used to determine third party rights in contracts should be used to
determine whether a treaty gives rise to individually enforceable rights. Under
the modified "intent-to-benefit" test, a non-party will have individually
enforceable rights under a treaty if such non-party is within a class of
individuals that are intended beneficiaries of the treaty.9 Applying this test
suggests that courts should consult with the drafting history of the treaty in
interpreting it.'" Finally, this approach suggests that the text of the document
in question does not need to create both a right and a remedy, once a party is
determined to be an intended beneficiary, he or she will have the right to
enforce the document."
I justify using an approach based in contract law with two positive
reasons and one negative reason. First, the question of individually
enforceable rights in treaties is more structurally similar to the question of third
party beneficiary rights under contracts than to the issue of private rights of
action in statutes.'2 Second, the text and history of the Constitution lend
support to the view that treaties should be interpreted as contracts. 3 Finally,
although textualism may be appropriate in the context of statutory
interpretation, it is not appropriate for purposes of treaty interpretation.' 4 I
apply the modified intent-to-benefit test that I propose to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Consular Convention),'" focusing on the
facts of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,'6 a case decided by the Supreme Court last
term, and two cases by Federal Appellate Courts decided since then.'7
Sanchez-Lllamas consolidated two cases in which two non-U.S. citizen
petitioners, who were arrested and tried in state courts, claimed that the United
States violated Article 36 of the Consular Convention by failing to notify them
about their right to receive assistance from their country's consulate.'" Both
petitioners argued that the Consular Convention provided them with individual
rights that were enforceable in a court. 9 As a remedy to the U.S. violation of
Article 36 of the Consular Convention, Sanchez-Llamas argued that certain
statements he made to the police should be suppressed," while the other
petitioner, Bustillo, wanted to suspend Virginia's procedural default rule that
9 See infra Part III.B. 1.
10 See infra Part I1I.B.2.
" See discussion infra Part III.A.
12 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
13 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
14 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
is Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter Consular Convention].
16 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
17 See discussion infra Part V.
18 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2671.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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would have otherwise barred his claim because he did not raise it during his
trial.2'
Instead of providing guidance to lower courts that had come to
diverging conclusions on this question,22 Justice Roberts, who wrote the
majority opinion, avoided the issue altogether by assuming (without deciding)
that the Consular Convention gives rise to individually enforceable rights."
The Court then held that the Consular Convention does not, however, give the
petitioners the remedies they sought.24  In so holding, the Court essentially
required that in order for a litigant to sue and seek a remedy under a treaty, the
treaty must state that the individual has individually enforceable rights, and its
text must expressly provide the exact remedy that the individual seeks."
Given the Court's failure to answer the question of whether the
Consular Convention creates individually enforceable rights, it is not
surprising that a circuit split has emerged on the question.26 The Ninth and
Seventh Circuits have recently considered whether a civil claim under the
Consular Convention against state officials can proceed through a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action, which allows individuals to sue state actors for violation of the
"Constitution and laws. 27 While the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that
the Consular Convention could be enforced through Section 1983,28 the
Seventh Circuit found that Section 1983 provides a remedy for treaties that
confer rights on individuals.29
Part I describes the Court's march towards textualism in statutory
interpretation. Part II traces the Court's increasing tendency to apply
textualism to treaty interpretation, particularly to the question of whether a
treaty gives rise to individually enforceable rights. Part III describes the
historical evolution of the intent-to-benefit test and lays out a proposal for a
21Id.22id
22 Before the Sanchez-Llamas decision, some courts had held that the Consular Convention
created private rights. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp.2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States
v. Superville, 40 F. Supp.2d 672, 677 (D.V.I. 1999); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d
74, 77-78 (D. Mass. 1999). However, other courts had held that the Consular Convention does not
create individually enforceable rights. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 196
(5th Cir. 2001).
23Id. at 2677-78 ("Because we conclude that Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo are not in any event
entitled to relief on their claims, we find it unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna
Convention grants individuals enforceable rights. Therefore, for purposes of addressing petitioners'
claims, we assume, without deciding, that Article 36 does grant Bustillo and Sanchez-Llamas such
rights.").
24 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2674-87.
25 The Supreme Court found that "where a treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either
expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking
of their own." Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2680.
26 Compare Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007), with Comejo v. San Diego, No. 05-
56202, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007).
27 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
28Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at *30 ("Accordingly, we hold that Article 36 does not
unambiguously give Comejo a privately enforceable right to be notified.").
29 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 835-36 ("Nothing in either the Vienna Convention or any other source of law
has been presented to us that would rebut [the] presumption" that "once a plaintiff demonstrates that a
statute confers an individual right, the right is enforceable by Section 1983.").
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modified intent-to-benefit test. Part IV justifies why the intentionalist
approach to contract interpretation is preferable to the textualist approach.
Finally, Part V applies the modified version of the intent-to-benefit test to the
Consular Convention in order to determine whether individuals have the right
to bring claims for violations of the Consular Convention and the right to
remedies for such violations.
I. THE RISE OF TEXTUALISM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court has increasingly used the textualist approach to
determine whether a statute creates a private cause of action. The Court,
however, has not always been swayed by textualism in this context. Indeed, as
with statutory interpretation generally, the Court has applied three different
theories of interpretation to determining whether a statute creates a private
right of action-intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism." Intentionalism
emphasizes the intent of the legislature enacting the statute and thus suggests
that courts should examine both a statute's text and legislative history in
determining its meaning.3 Purposivism de-emphasizes the legislature's intent
and instead seeks to understand the statute's broad purposes to determine
whether implication of a private right of action would further the statute's
purpose. 2 Textualism attempts generally to ascertain the meaning of a statute
by looking only at its text and de-emphasizes the intent of those who enacted
the statute.33
In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,' one of the first Supreme Court cases to
imply a private right of action, the Court applied a methodology based on
purposivism. The Court recognized a private right of action under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, because it noted that a private cause of
action should be implied in a statute whenever such a remedy would advance
the statute's purpose."
In an attempt to narrow Borak, the Supreme Court proposed a four-
factor test in Cort v. Ash,36 that was motivated by both purposivism and
intentionalism. Under the Cort test, courts had to determine: (1) whether the
plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted,
30 Branford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34
ARIz. ST. L.J. 815, 818 (2002).
31Id. at 818. See also Ediberto Roman, Statutory Interpretation in Securities Jurisprudence: A
Failure of Textualism, 75 NEB. L. REV. 377, 388 (1996). There are two types of intentionalism:
archeological and hypothetical. Archeological intentionalism seeks to identify the intent of the
legislature based on the statute's text and legislative history, while hypothetical intentionalism seeks to
determine how a legislature would have wanted a particular issue resolved. Id. at 388-89.
32 Mank, supra note 30, at 818-19. See also Roman, supra note 31, at 389-90.
33 Mank, supra note 30, at 819. See also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29-
30 (1997) ("My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the
legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history
should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute's meaning.").
377 U.S. 426 (1964). The case is discussed in Mank, supra note 30, at 845. See also Cannon
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
35 Mank, supra note 30, at 845.
36422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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(2) whether there is implicit or explicit evidence that Congress intended to
grant the proposed right of action, (3) whether a private right of action would
advance the "underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," and (4) whether
the cause of action is traditionally identified with state law such that a federal
cause of action would impede important state concerns. 7 Thus, courts were
asked to consider both the intent of the legislature as well as the purpose of the
statute when determining whether the statute gave rise to a private right of• 31
action.
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 9 the Court purported to apply the
Cort test, but it focused narrowly on the prong requiring congressional intent to
create a right of action.4' However, in determining such intent, the Court
refused to consult extra-textual sources." Consequently, the Court concluded
that the statute in question did not create a private right of action, because the
text of the statute did not manifest congressional intent to create such a right."
On the other hand, Cannon, decided the same year as Touche Ross,
also applied the Cort test, but its approach was motivated by intentionalism.
3
The Court permitted a woman to sue two private universities for denying her
admission on the basis of her sex because it found that Title IX of the
Education Amendments created an implied right of action." The Court
reasoned that, although the statute does not expressly authorize a private right
of action, the statute satisfies the "threshold question" under Cort-whether it
was "enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a
member."4 ' The relevant statute stated that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program orS ,,46
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. In holding that the statute
satisfied the first factor of the Cort test, Justice Stevens noted that Congress
drafted the statute "with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class." 7 He
further found that "the right- or duty-creating language of the statute has
generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a
37 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
38 Roman, supra note 31, at 401.
39 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
40 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
41 See id. See also Roman, supra note 31, at 402-05 (noting the shift in the Court's approach
towards textualism post-Cort v. Ash); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in
Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 868-69
(1996); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
Rev. 1193, 1196 (1982) ("The past few years, however, have seen a sharp reversal. The Supreme
Court has all but repudiated Borak and has created a strong presumption against judicial recognition of
private rights of action. The Court's restrictive approach has provoked sharp controversy. Some
commentators argue that it has deprived regulatory beneficiaries of an appropriate and effective
remedy for administrative failure.").
42 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 579.
43 See discussion infra Section III.
44 Cannon, 411 U.S. at 728-29.
45 Id. at 689-94.
4 6 Id. at 681-82.
47 Id. at 691.
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cause of action. 4 8 The opinion consulted liberally with the legislative history
and concluded that every other factor of Cort was also satisfied. 9
More recently, the Court's opinion in Alexander v. Sandoval," marked
the Court's clear direction towards textualism. In Sandoval, a private
individual sued to enforce a regulation promulgated by the Department of
Justice pursuant to Title VI.' Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion,
stated his methodology as such: "[w]e ... begin (and find that we can end) our
search for Congress's intent with the text and structure of Title VI." 52
Focusing solely on the words of the statute in question, the Court found that "§
602 reveals no congressional intent to create a private right of action." 53
In addition, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, " in distinguishing Section
1983 actions from other types of cases, the Court emphasized that a "plaintiff
suing under an implied right of action still must show that the statute manifests
an intent 'to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.' 55 Thus,
the Court refused to find that a private cause of action existed in the statute
because the statute in question only contained language that suggested that
individuals have rights, but did not explicitly state that individuals have a
private right of action to enforce the statute.56 In determining congressional
intent, the Court analyzed only the "text and structure" of the statute and
concluded that Congress did not intend to create new individual rights.5"
Consequently, although historically the Court has utilized three
different theories to determine whether a statute gives rise to individually
enforceable rights, and sometimes a hybrid of two theories, the modem
approach favors textualism. Even when courts have used the language of
intentionalism, they often refuse to look outside the text of the statute to
determine congressional intent. The practical effect of the textualist approach
is that courts are less likely to imply a cause of action in a statute, since this
approach prohibits courts from searching extra-textual sources that might show
that Congress intended to benefit third parties.58
II. THE RISE OF TEXTUALISM 1N TREATY INTERPRETATION
The principles of treaty interpretation employed by the Supreme Court
loosely parallel the three theories that underlie statutory interpretation
described in Section I above-intentionalism, purposivism and textualism. As
48 Id. at 690 n. 13.
49 Id. at 694-709.
50 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
51 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278.52 Id. at 288.
53Id. at 289.
54536 U.S. 273 (2002).
55 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286).
56 Id. at 283-84.
57 Id. at 286.
58 Benjamin Labow, Note, Federal Courts: Alexander v. Sandoval: Civil Rights Without
Remedies, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 205, 224 (2003).
44:63
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in the statutory interpretation context, the theory that underlines a court's
methodology informs whether or not it will use extra-textual sources in
determining the meaning of a treaty. The Court's opinion last term in Sanchez-
Llamas adopted a textualist framework in determining individually enforceable
rights under the Consular Convention.59  The consequence of using the
textualist approach to treaty interpretation is that it is less likely that courts will
allow individuals to bring claims based on treaties, because the text of treaties
rarely explicitly provide for individually enforceable rights.
On the other hand, courts that take an intentionalist approach6 often
employ a canon of treaty interpretation that calls for treaties to be interpreted
"liberally" and in "good faith."6' Courts often use this approach to justify
employing a theory of intentionalism. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States, 62 exemplifies this approach. In that case, the Court wrote that "treaties
are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties., 63  Under
the intentionalist approach, courts often consult extra-textual sources without
regard to whether or not the text of the treaty is ambiguous and may consult
extra-textual sources even when they find the text of the treaty to be clear.
Alternatively, courts also use the purposivism theory advocated by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Treaty Convention). The Treaty
Convention calls for treaty interpreters to interpret the treaty "in light of its
object and purpose., 65 Although the United States is not a party to the Treaty
Convention, courts have applied its methodology as customary international
law.6 In limited circumstances, the Treaty Convention allows for consultation
with extra-textual materials.67
59 See discussion infra Section V.
60 See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S.
123, 127 (1928); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424,
437 (1902); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 475 (1891); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).
See also Michael S. Straubel, Textualism, Contextualism, and Scientific Method in Treaty
Interpretation: How Do We Find the Shared Intent of the Parties?, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1191, 1192-93
(1994) (describing concerns in the debate between textualism and contextualism).61 In elaborating on "liberal interpretation," in the 1890 Supreme Court opinion in De Geofroy v.
Riggs, Justice Field stated that: "[ilt is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that
they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure
equality and reciprocity between them." De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267, 271. The notion of good faith is
often linked with liberal interpretation and was described by Justice Brown in Tucker v. Alexandroff,
where he said that a treaty
should be interpreted... in a manner to carry out its manifest purpose.... [They]
should be interpreted in that broad and liberal spirit which is calculated to make
for the existence of a perpetual amity [between nations], so far as it can be done
without the sacrifice of individual rights or those principles of personal liberty
which lie at the foundation of our jurisprudence.
Tucker, 183 U.S. at 437.
62 318 U.S. 423 (1943).63 Id. at 431-32.
(A Straubel, supra note 60, at 1201.
6S Treaty Convention, supra note 2, art. 31, § 1.
66See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 950 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While the United
States is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, it is the policy of the United States to apply articles
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The third approach to treaty interpretation, textualism, 8 is exemplified
in Chan v. Korean Airways, Ltd.6" In that case, Justice Scalia stated:
We must thus be governed by the text--solemnly adopted by
the governments of many separate nations--whatever
conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting history
that petitioners and the United States have brought to our
attention. The latter may of course be consulted to elucidate a
text that is ambiguous ... But where the text is clear, as it is
here, we have no power to insert an amendment."
In his concurrence in Chan, Justice Brennan took issue with the majority's
textualist approach to treaty interpretation, asserting that "it is wrong to
disregard the wealth of evidence to be found in the Convention's drafting
history on the intent of the governments that drafted the document. It is
altogether proper that we consider such extrinsic evidence of the treatymakers'
intent."7'
According to some commentators, courts are increasingly applying
textualist theories to treaty interpretation.72 The textualist approach and the
language of statutory interpretation 3 have also been used to determine whether
31 and 32 as customary international law."); Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308
(2d Cir. 2000) ("In some cases, the customary international law of a certain area is itself codified in a
treaty. Such is the case with the customary international law of treaties, which to a large extent has
been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(the 'Vienna Convention')."); Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1362 (2d Cir.
1992) ("Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is a signatory. We have
previously applied the Vienna Convention in interpreting treaties .. . as has the United States
Department of State.").
67 Treaty Convention, supra note 2, art. 31, § 1. See also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S.
155, 194 (1993) ("Reliance on a treaty's negotiating history (travaux preparatoires) is a disfavored
alternative of last resort, appropriate only where the terms of the document are obscure or lead to
,manifestly absurd or unreasonable' results." (citing Treaty Convention, supra note 2, art. 32).
68 Straubel, supra note 60, at 1191-92.
69 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
70 Chan, 490 U.S. at 134.
71 Id. at 136.
72 See, e.g., Michael Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 691
(1998) ("[T]he Court's treaty jurisprudence has fallen under the strong influence of a resurgent strain
of formalism in domestic statutory interpretation."); David Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty
Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953, 1022 (1994) ("So while the prevailing rhetoric of [treaty
interpretation] is contractual, the underlying idiom and approach is statutory."); id. at 1019-20 (1994)
("[R]ecent trends in treaty construction have been subliminally influenced by currents in the statutory
interpretation debate.").
7 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) ("As for Paraguay's suits (both the original
action and the case coming to us on petition for certiorari), neither the text nor the history of the
Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United States courts
to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions.")
(emphasis added); Haudenosaunee Six Nations of Iroquois (Confederacy) of N. Am. v. Canada, No.
98-CV-01 12E(H), 1998 WL 748351, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998) ("It is readily apparent-and
Judge Arcara of this Court has previously held-that the Treaty does not create a private cause of
action.") (emphasis added); In re Letters Rogatory from Caracas, No. M15-377, 1998 WL 107029, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1998) (holding that those plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce a provision of a
treaty which did not confer any identifiable right upon them); DiLaura v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 786 F.
Supp. 241, 252 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) ("A treaty must provide expressly for a private right of action before
44:63
HeinOnline  -- 44 Stan. J. Int'l L.  72 2008
2008 The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights Under 73
International Treaties
individually enforceable rights exist under treaties. For example, the statutory
language of "private right of action" appears in numerous Supreme Court
treaty cases, including Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,74
where the Court indicated that the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and
the Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention "only set forth substantive
rules of conduct and states that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs.
They do not create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover
compensation from foreign states in United States courts.""
The Court's decision last term in Sanchez-Llamas signaled the
inclination of the Roberts Court to apply textualism in questions of treaty
interpretation. Although the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts
paid lip service to the canon of liberal interpretation,76 in reality it did not
liberally interpret the Consular Convention. Instead the Court applied a
textualist interpretation-it denied the remedies sought by the petitioners
because the document's text it did explicitly specify those remedies.77 Thus,
under Sanchez-Llamas, in order for a litigant to enforce a treaty, she must not
only show that the treaty creates individually enforceable rights, but also that
the text provides the remedy that the litigant seeks.
Although the Supreme Court has not adopted a presumption against
individually enforceable rights in treaties, " in the last thirty years many lower
courts have adopted such a presumption. '9 This approach represents a
departure from the period between 1789 and 1975, when there were no judicial
decisions "endorsing the nationalist presumption against individual
enforcement of treaty rights"; rather, there were "dozens of Supreme Court
decisions that applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of individual
enforcement of treaty-based primary rights."8 This shift from a presumption
in favor of domestic judicial remedies to a presumption against it appears to
coincide with a shift from an intentionalist approach to a textualist approach to
determining whether a treaty creates individually enforceable rights.
a plaintiff can assert a claim thereunder in federal court." (citing Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24,
30 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976))) (emphasis added); Smith v. Canadian Pac.
Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir.197 1). See also Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30 (treaty must provide
expressly for a private right of action before a plaintiff can assert a claim thereunder in federal court)
(emphasis added).
74 488 U.S. 428 (1989),
75 Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
76 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2679.
77 Id. at 2677-83.
78 Indeed, the dissent in Sanchez-Llamas disagreed with the government's position that there is a
presumption against individually enforceable rights in treaties. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2697.
79 David Sloss, When do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court
Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 20, 27 (2006).
80 Id .
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III. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE INTENT-TO-BENEFIT TEST AND A
PROPOSAL FOR A MODIFIED INTENT-TO-BENEFIT TEST
The shift towards textualism in statutory interpretation has carried over
into inquiries about whether a treaty can be enforced by someone who is not a81
party to it. For the reasons discussed in Part IV infra, courts should be
guided by intentionalist theories used in determining third party beneficiary
rights under contracts rather than textualist theories based in statutory
interpretation. This Part III describes the basis for the intent-to-benefit test in
contract law and develops a modified version of the test for purposes of treaty
interpretation.
A. The Contract Law Approach to Determining Third Party Enforcement
Rights
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Second Restatement)82
codifies the modem approach to determining whether a person who is not a
party to a contract is nevertheless entitled to enforce it. The intent-to-benefit
test derived from Section 302(l)(b) of the Second Restatement suggests that a
third party should be entitled to enforce a contract if the parties intended to
benefit such party and the circumstances (including extra-textual materials)
indicate that the promisor intended to give the benefit of the promised
performance to the third party.83 The Second Restatement's intentionalist
approach is a departure from the more textualist approach to contract
interpretation used in the Restatement (First) of Contracts (First Restatement). 4
Modem third party beneficiary concepts trace their roots to English
common law. Dutton v. Poole" is often cited to illustrate the roots of third
party beneficiary law. In that case, a father was going to sell wood to raise
money for a dowry for his daughter.86 His son, who otherwise would have
inherited the wood, promised the father that he would pay £1000 to the
daughter if the father did not sell the wood.87 The father died and the son
refused to pay the money to the daughter. Although the daughter was not a
party to the contract, the court held that the daughter could enforce the contract
against the son.8"
As classical contract theory gained popularity in England, courts
became reluctant to grant rights to individuals who were not party to a contract
since doing so often required deviating from the express text of the contract.
81 See supra Parts I, II.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
83 Id. § 302(1)(b).
84RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-47 (1932).
8 (1677) 83 Eng. Rep. 523 (K.B.).
86Id. at 523.
87 Id.
Id. at 524.
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Indeed, the principle favoring third party beneficiary rights was repudiated in
Tweddle v. Atkinson.89 In that case the court found that a son-in-law could not
enforce a contract against his father-in-law, who had promised to pay the son-
in-law's father a certain sum of money.9"
The same tension between acknowledging the rights of third party
beneficiaries and classical contract theory played itself out in U.S. courts.9'
Although third party beneficiaries were permitted to enforce contracts long
before Lawrence v. Fox,2 the New York Court of Appeals decision in that case
is often cited as the turning point for recognition of third party beneficiary
rights. "3 In that case, under a contract between Holly and Fox, Holly loaned
$300 to Fox, and Fox in turn agreed to pay $300 to Lawrence in satisfaction of
a preexisting debt that Holly owed to Lawrence.' The court held that
Lawrence could enforce the contract against Fox even though he was not in
privity of contract. 95 In subsequent years, New York courts pared back the
holding in Lawrence v. Fox to its bare minimum.96 Other state courts, notably
Massachusetts, refused to recognize third party beneficiary rights altogether. "7
The rise of modem contract law in the 1920s led to the recognition of
the enforcement of rights of third party beneficiaries, a shift that was ultimately
codified in the First Restatement. Section 133 of the First Restatement
provided:
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit
a person other than the promisee, that person is... :
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part
of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary
or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due
from the promisee to the beneficiary;
89(1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B.).
90 Id. at 763-764.
91 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1365-
68 (1992) (pointing out that recognizing third party beneficiary rights conflicts with the following
three major premises of classical contract law: First, contract law can and should be developed in an
axiomatic fashion. Second, persons would not readily engage in contracting if they faced the threat of
high liability. Third, standardized rules are preferable to individualized rules); id. at 1365 (arguing
that third party beneficiary law conflicts with all three principles because: First, it is at odds with
basic principles of contract law that require that there must be privity and consideration in order to
enforce a contract. Second, allowing third party beneficiaries to bring suit expands a promisors'
liability. Third, in adjudicating suits by third party beneficiaries, courts would need to conduct
individualized inquiries into the facts and intent).
92 20 N.Y. 268 (N.Y. 1859).
93 Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 1363-64.
94 Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 269.
95 Id. at 269-274.
Eisenberg, supra note 91, at 1368.
97Id. at 1367.
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(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears
from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy an
actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary... ;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in
Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause (b) exist.
Even though the First Restatement acknowledged enforcement rights
for third parties, it narrowly circumscribed those rights. Under the First
Restatement, only two categories of individuals were given enforceable
rights-creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries. " A donee beneficiary
was a beneficiary to whom the promisee intended to benefit as a gift. A
creditor beneficiary was a beneficiary to whom the promisee owed a debt that
he or she wished to satisfy by requiring the promisor to make a payment to the
beneficiary."
The Second Restatement broadened the scope of third parties that have
enforceable rights.'"0 Although contract disputes are governed by state law,
many states have adopted the Second Restatement's third party beneficiary
test.' Section 302(1) of the Second Restatement states that:
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if
recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either:
98 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 135-36 (1932) (providing for enforcement rights for
creditor and donee beneficiaries).
99 Id. § 133(1)(a).
1o0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
101 See, e.g., Septembertide Publishing v. Stein & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675 (2d. Cir. 1989)
(identifying Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as the appropriate test to determine
third party beneficiary rights under New York law); Flexfab, L.L.C. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 139
(Fed. Cl. 2004) (explaining that the subcontractor failed to establish that it was a third party
beneficiary of contract between contractor and the government because modification of contract made
it a joint payee). See also David M. Summers, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 880, 889-90 (1982) ("It is not surprising that the tentative
provisions of the Restatement Second met with approval in both state and federal courts. The
Restatement Second's approach potentially offers a consistent rationale for third party beneficiary
cases falling outside the First Restatement categories, and for the new and complex factual situations
likely to arise in the future."); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37:5 (4th ed. updated May 2007) ("In a significant number of states, certain
aspects of the law relating to contracts for the benefit of third persons are governed by statute. Most
of these statutes are of a limited nature, regulating a few, well-defined areas of third party beneficiary
doctrine, and governing specific contractual relationships. Some states, however, have broad statutory
provisions which effectively codify and implement the common-law third party beneficiary doctrine.
For example, the California statute, on which several others are based, provides that '[a] contract,
made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties
thereto rescind it."'). But see id. § 37:7 ("The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also classifies the
protected and unprotected beneficiaries, but eliminates the terminology 'creditor' and 'donee'
beneficiaries, lumping the protected beneficiaries into one broad class, 'intended' beneficiaries, and
designating all other, unprotected beneficiaries as 'incidental.' This change in terminology has not
been well received by the courts, in part because of their familiarity with the traditional phraseology
and in part because of its helpful, descriptive qualities.").
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(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation
of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance. 02
In applying the Second Restatement test, one federal court of appeals
classified it into two components: (1) an intent-to-benefit test; and (2) a duty
owed test.' 3 The intent-to-benefit test flows from Section 302(1)(b), while the
"duty owed" test is set out in Section 302(1)(a) of the Second Restatement.
The duty owed test requires that "the promisor's performance under the
contract must discharge a duty otherwise owed the third party by the
promisee."" To satisfy the intent-to-benefit test, "the contract must express
some intent by the parties to benefit the third party through contractual
performance."'0 5 Breaking with the First Restatement, the intent-to-benefit test
102 The Second Restatement adds another basis for a beneficiary to be considered an "intended
beneficiary"--those whose reliance on the promisee is both reasonable and probable. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d (1981). ("Either a promise to pay the promisee's debt to a
beneficiary or a gift promise involves a manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor
sufficient, in a contractual setting, to make reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable.
Other cases may be quite similar in this respect. Examples are a promise to perform a supposed or
asserted duty of the promisee, a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee's property, or a promise
to satisfy the duty of a third person. In such cases, if the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on
the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary. Where
there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable, considerations of procedural convenience
and other factors not strictly dependent on the manifested intention of the parties may affect the
question whether under Subsection (1) recognition of a right in the beneficiary is appropriate. In some
cases an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, requires recognition of such a right
without regard to the intention of the parties.").
103Dayton Development Co. v. Gilman Financial Services, Inc., 419 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005).
See also E.B. Harper & Co. v. Nortek, Inc., 104 F.3d 913, 920 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) ("In order for a
third party to have a right to sue, the contract must be undertaken for plaintiff's direct benefit and the
contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear .... If the intent is not express on the face
of the contract, its implication at least must be so strong as to be practically an express declaration.")
(citations omitted); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]o create
a third party beneficiary contract, the parties must intend that the promisor assume a direct obligation
to the intended beneficiary at the time they enter into the contract .... To determine the contracting
parties' intent, the court should construe the contract as a whole, in light of the circumstances under
which it was made."); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that as is generally the
case in matters of contract interpretation, the crux of third party beneficiary analysis is intent of
parties); Camco Oil Corp. v. Vander Laan, 220 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1955) ("[I]n order for a third
party to recover on a contract to which he is not a party, it must clearly be shown that the contract was
intended for his benefit.").
104 Dayton, 419 F.3d at 857 (citing Cretex Cos., Inc. v. Constr. Leaders, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 135,
138 (Minn. 1984)).
5 Id. at 856 (citing Cretex, 342 N.W.2d at 138). Some courts adopt a test that requires the
contract to manifest not only an intent-to-benefit the third party, but also an "intent to create a right of
action." See, e.g., Dureiko v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 340, 364 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (finding that the
owner of a mobile home park was not an intended beneficiary of a contract between the government
and a company that removed debris, because the contract did not "reflect an intention to create
enforceable rights in plaintiffs"). However, such a test is inconsistent with the modem principles
enshrined in the Second Restatement and is another manifestation of an attempt by courts to import
the statutory interpretation model into determinations of whether a contract creates individual
enforcement rights.
David Summers also points out that some courts incorrectly found that because the primary
purpose of a contract was not to benefit the third party beneficiary, the contract did not give rise to
individual enforcement rights. Summers, supra note 101, at 892-93 (citing Sachs v. Ohio Nat'l Life
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suggests that a third party does not have to be either a creditor or a donee to
enforce a contract. Under the intent-to-benefit test, whether a non-party has
the right to enforce a contract turns on intent rather than on the relationship
between the promisor and the party attempting to enforce the contract. 106 In
addition, under the Second Restatement an intended beneficiary may enforce
the contract in question without having to show that the contract explicitly
allows for the remedy sought by the intended beneficiary.' 7  Intended
beneficiaries may also obtain specific performance as a remedy.'08
The shift in approach to third party beneficiaries from the First
Restatement to the Second Restatement is consistent with the diverging
contract law theories espoused by the drafters of the Restatements. Samuel
Williston, the main drafter of the First Restatement, was influenced by
classical contract theory, which rejects searching for the intent of the parties
outside of the "four comers" of the contract."'° Williston believed that
contracts should be interpreted in much the same manner as the textualists
interpret statutes today."'  He argued that evidence of contemporaneous
agreements and negotiations about the contract and the meaning of its terms
should not be used to explain the parties' intentions or to vary or contradict the
plain meaning of the agreement.' Clearly, such a theory would frown upon
granting rights to individuals who are not parties to a contract unless such
rights are explicitly written in the contract.
The Second Restatement, on the other hand, deviated from utilizing
the textualist theory suggested by classical contract theory in favor of an
intentionalist approach."2 The underpinning of the intentionalist theory is that
contract interpretation is a search for the shared intent of the parties, and the
written language of the contract is only probative, but not conclusive of such
intent. "' In line with this theory, Corbin, the principal influence behind the
Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1945) (beneficiary of a reinsurance may not recover because
agreement was not made "for his direct benefit, or... primarily for his benefit."); Daniel-Morris Co.
v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 126 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1955) (holding that a materialman may sue as third
party beneficiary on a payment bond because bond's primary purpose was payment of materialmen);
Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mech. Contractors, 406 P.2d 556, 569 (Or. 1965)
(subcontractors not third party beneficiaries of fire-insurance policy without proof that contracting
parties "had in mind a benefit to anyone other than themselves")).
106 13 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 101, § 37:8.
107 SECOND RESTATEMENT § 304. See also Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 208 N.E.2d 12 (I11. App.
Ct. 1965).
108SECOND RESTATEMENT § 307.
109 See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1012-13 (1985).
10 Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for
New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199-200 (1998).
I Id. at 200-02.
12 One commentator has pointed out the difficulty in determining the intent of the parties. Oma
S. Paglin, Criteria for Recognition of Third Party Beneficiary Rights, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 66-67
(1989). See also AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 5 (2007) ("Unfortunately, determining the intention of
the contracting parties with respect to a third person is not the easiest of legal tasks.").
"3 See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statues Really "Legislative Bargains"?: The Failure of the
Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145, 1162 (1998) ("Yet, in significant
respects, contemporary contract interpretation has come to reject the classical model. Under
contemporary principles, contract interpretation is not principally a search for the objective meaning
of a text, but rather a search for the shared intent of the parties. To be sure, the words of the parties'
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Second Restatement, advocated the liberalization of the parol evidence rule to
make extrinsic evidence more readily admissible by allowing a written contract
to be supplemented by extrinsic evidence unless the written contract was a
complete integration."4 Consequently, the intent-to-benefit test was influenced
by the intentionalist approach that prevailed in the drafting of the Second
Restatement. As such, the test favors allowing courts to consult with extra-
textual sources in determining the intent of the parties."'
B. The Modified Intent-to-Benefit Test
The modified intent-to-benefit test proposed here broadens the
approach of the Second Restatement's intent-to-benefit test by taking account
of certain characteristics of multi-party treaties. First, a class of individuals
rather than one specific individual may be the intended beneficiaries of multi-
party treaties. Second, multi-party treaties are negotiated by delegates from
numerous countries and often have drafting histories consisting of the
discussion and proposals offered by the delegates. Third, determining the
shared intent of parties to a multi-party treaty may be more complicated than
determining the intent underlying contracts with a few parties. Thus, the
modified intent-to-benefit test considers these factors in designing a test that is
more applicable to multi-party treaties.
1. Class of Individuals as Intended Beneficiaries
The Restatement Second does not require that an intended beneficiary
be identified at the time the contract is formed,"6 and allows for more than one
intended beneficiary to a contract."7 Courts have found that in order for a class
of individuals to be deemed beneficiaries of a contract, the class of individuals
written agreement will be probative of their intent; in most cases, in fact, the words will provide
conclusive evidence. But the goal, as Arthur Corbin once explained, 'is the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties (their meaning), and not the meaning that the written words convey ... to any
third persons, few or many, reasonably intelligent or otherwise.' Under contemporary principles,
where extrinsic evidence shows that the parties shared an intent at odds with the objective meaning of
the written agreement, their intent, not the writing, prevails."). See also id. at 1149 ("Contract
interpretation is properly intentionalist: in interpreting a contract, a court properly looks to the shared
intent of the parties rather than the objective meaning of the written agreement. A contract, after all, is
a private agreement that binds only the parties who make it. It exists independently of any writing the
parties have adopted to memorialize it: the writing is not the contract, but merely evidence of the
contract. In traditional form, moreover, a contract comprises just two parties and a limited subject
matter. Given all this, intentionalism is a sensible interpretive strategy. Concerns about notice to third
persons do not exist; the writing bears little formal significance; and there is small chance that
examining a contract's negotiating history will present great practical burdens.").
14 Ross & Tranen, supra note 110, at 205-06.
15 It should be noted that some scholars have argued that, at least with respect to contracts
between sophisticated firms, it is more appropriate to apply textualism than the Restatement Second's
intentionalist approach, because textualism is more in line with the desires of those parties. See, e.g.,
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J.
541, 618-19 (2003).
16 SECOND RESTATEMENT § 308.
17 See, e.g., id. § 302, illus. 14.
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must be sufficiently described or designated as intended beneficiaries in the
contract. Furthermore, a third party who seeks rights under such a contract
must show that he or she is within the class of intended beneficiaries. For
example, the Ninth Circuit found the parties to a consent decree intended to
benefit all prisoners held in a certain jail because the consent decree referred to
"inmates" and "residents."' 8 Thus, although they were not specifically named
in the consent decree, the court found that all 300 prisoners held in the jail
were within the class of intended beneficiaries. 9
In another case, a federal district court in New York held that garment
industry workers, who were not specifically identified in an agreement
between a clothing manufacturer and the Department of Labor, could
nevertheless enforce the agreement as third party beneficiaries.' 0 The court
found that the parties intended to benefit the workers because the contract with
the Department of Labor required that the clothing manufacturer not only pay
minimum wages to its own workers, but also required it not to outsource any
work to companies that did not pay their workers minimum wages and
overtime."' Thus, the court concluded that the contract evidenced an intent-to-
benefit employees of a company with whom the clothing manufacturer had
contracted.'22 The plaintiffs were within the class of intended beneficiaries
because they were employees of a company to whom the defendant outsourced
its work.'23 Thus, in order for a treaty to give rise to individually enforceable
rights, it must benefit a class of individuals, and the third party claiming rights
thereunder must be a member of the class of individuals.
2. Consulting Travaux Pr~paratoires
In determining whether the parties intended to benefit a class of
individuals, the intentionalist theory underlying the intent-to-benefit test
counsels that courts should look not only to the written words of the treaty, but
18 Hook v. State of Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 972 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The decree lists
'inmates' and 'residents' as the intended beneficiaries of the consent decree. Thus, the 265 inmates are
intended third party beneficiaries that have standing to enforce the rights of the inmates under the
consent decree."). See also 17 AM. JUR. 2D 740, § 3.13 ("Where the third-person beneficiary is so
described as to be ascertainable, it is not necessary that he or she be named in the contract in order to
recover thereon. Indeed he or she may be one of a class of persons, if the class is sufficiently
described or designated.").
119 Hook, 972 F.2d at 1015-16.
120 Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, 226 F. Supp.2d 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
121 Id. at 363 ("Based on the language of the agreement itself, it is strikingly obvious that the
entire purpose of the ACPA is to ensure that employees of factories which contract with Street Beat
are paid minimum wage and overtime, and that it was they who were directly intended to be
benefited."). See also Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (Fed. Cl. 2005)
(finding that irrigators were third party beneficiaries of contracts between the United States and certain
water districts because contracts expressed intent of the relevant district and the United States to
benefit irrigators directly by having the district assume the primary responsibility for providing water
within the district in exchange for collecting amounts owed by the irrigator in payment for their
water).
122Chen, 226 F. Supp.2d at 357-58.
123 Id. at 363.
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also to extrinsic materials. 2 1 Indeed, Section 302(b) of the Restatement
Second specifically states that courts may look to the "circumstances"
surrounding a contract.'25 The Reporter's Note to the Section 302 of the
Restatement Section also emphasizes the point: "[a] court in determining the
parties' intention should consider the circumstances surrounding the
transaction as well as the actual language of the contract."' 26  The relevant
extrinsic materials are the ones that provide insight into the shared intent of the
parties to a contract.' 2  The travaux pr~paratoires, also known as the drafting
history or the negotiating history, of a treaty ' demonstrates the intent of the
parties to the treaty. Thus, under the modified intent-to-benefit test, courts
should privilege the drafting history over other sources in interpreting a treaty.
Alstine provides four alternate grounds justifying the use of drafting
history in treaty interpretation that are consistent with my conclusion.' 29 First,
using the drafting history helps to create a uniform international interpretation,
because courts in other countries can also consult the same history.'30 Second,
treaties are negotiated by representatives of the Executive, making concerns
about unconstitutional "self-delegation" on the part of Congress irrelevant."'
Third, the argument advanced by textualists that refusing to consult extra-
textual sources enhances democracy by encouraging Congress to draft
legislation more carefully and to be more diligent in amending outdated
legislation is not applicable because once a multilateral treaty is effective, it is
almost impossible to amend. '312 Moreover, since treaties are negotiated among
many different countries, the drafters of treaties do not necessarily look to the
legislature from any one country in drafting the treaty. Finally, the drafting
124 See, e.g., Movesesian, supra note 113, at 1162. See also Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 940
(11 th Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen determining whether the parties to the contract intended to bestow a benefit
on a third party, a court may look beyond the contract to the circumstances surrounding its
formation."); Southridge Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Lowry, 188 F. Supp.2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(determining third party beneficiary status under New York law, it is permissible for the court to look
at the surrounding circumstances as well as the agreement).
125RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). Conversely, Movesesian argues that
consulting extra-textual sources to determine the intent of the parties to a contract could be detrimental
to a third party who might be bound by terms that he or she never consented to. Movesesian, supra
note 113, at 1174. The concern raised by Movesesian would be applicable in only one very limited
circumstance-when the parties to a contract colluded to deceive the third party by writing favorable
provisions in the contract in favor of the beneficiary, but their true intent was to provide the third party
with no benefit. This situation is not likely to occur often. In addition, parties to a contract would fail
in an attempt to refer to extrinsic material that might directly contradict the text of a contract. Finally,
other doctrines, such as those requiring good faith and clean hands, would probably prevent the parties
from arguing that their true intent of deceiving the third party should govern to deny the third party
any benefit.
126 SECOND RESTATEMENT § 302 reporter's note.
127Id. (citing a number of articles that refer to the parties' intention as a key factor in third party
beneficiary contracts).
128 Jonathan Pratter, A la Recherche des Travaux Pr~paratoires: An Approach to Researching the
Drafting History ofInternational Agreements, GLOBALEX, Dec. 2005, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/
globalex/Travaux Preparatoires.htm.
129 Alstine, supra note 72, at 744-48.
130 Id. at 744-45.
131 Id. at 745-46.
12 Id. at 746.
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history is increasingly important because of the indeterminacy of international
standards and the difficulty in amending a treaty.'33
On the other hand, the intent-to-benefit test suggests that courts should
give less weight to a treaty's domestic ratification history because it reflects
either the intent of a non-party (the Senate) or the intent of just one party to the
treaty (the Executive). ' As Justice Scalia pointed out in United States v.
Stuart,'3 the question is
what the two or more sovereigns agreed to, rather than what a
single one of them, or the legislature of a single one of them,
thought it agreed to. And to answer that question accurately, it
can reasonably be said, whatever extratextual materials are
consulted must be materials that reflect the mutual agreement
(for example, the negotiating history) rather than a unilateral
understanding.' 6
At first blush Justice Scalia's statements in Stuart might seem to contradict his
commitment to a textualist theory of interpretation, but in fact no such
contradiction exists. Although Justice Scalia criticized using the domestic
ratification history of the treaty to determine its meaning, he did not advocate
the use of any other extra-textual sources."'
Constitutional arguments also support the view that courts should not
consult with domestic ratification history in interpreting the meaning of a
treaty. Giving credence to what the Senators of the ratifying Congress thought
a treaty meant could be akin to allowing the Senators to amend the meaning of
a treaty. Even though Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution gives the
Senate the power to provide "advice and consent" to the President in ratifying
a treaty, it does not give the Senate the unilateral right to change the terms or
meaning of a treaty. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in The Diamond Rings,' 8
Justice Brown made the point that a treaty cannot be amended simply by a
resolution adopted by Congress. "9
133 Id. at 747.
134 The principles suggested in this article apply to the interpretation of treaties and not
necessarily to interpreting the legislation implementing treaties. For example, in Auguste v. Ridge,
395 F.3d 123, 130-34 (3d Cir. 2005), it may have been appropriate for the court to consult with
ratification history of the treaty to determine the meaning of the federal statute and regulations
implementing the treaty.
135 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
136 Stuart, 489 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).
137 See id.
138 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
139 183 U.S. at 182-83 (Brown, J., concurring) ("To be efficacious such resolution must be
considered either (1) as an amendment to the treaty, or (2) as a legislative act qualifying or modifying
the treaty. It is neither. It cannot be regarded as part of the treaty, since it received neither the
approval of the President nor the consent of the other contracting power .... The Senate has no right
to ratify the treaty and introduce new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other power,
although it may refuse its ratification, or make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of
amendments to the treaty.").
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While courts have consulted with extra-textual sources for purposes of
treaty interpretation, 140 they have not followed any "principled ways to choose
among extratextual materials.""' The contract law approach provides a
principled way to choose among the sources. It suggests that sources that
manifest the shared intent of the parties should be privileged over sources that
might reveal only the intent of one of the parties or of a non-party.
3. Level ofAmbiguity Needed to Consult Extra-Textual Sources
Another important question that should be addressed is what (if any)
level of ambiguity justifies consulting extrinsic sources to determine the intent
of the parties under the intent-to-benefit test. Some courts that apply textualist
approaches refuse to consult with extra-textual sources under any
circumstances even if there is ambiguity in the text, while others will consult
such sources so long as there is a high-level of ambiguity in the text.' 42 In the
middle of the spectrum are those who follow the Treaty Convention approach,
which suggests consulting with extra-textual sources more readily than the
textualist approach, but still requires a relatively high level of ambiguity
(although perhaps a lower level than the textualists).4 3 However, the intent-to-
benefit test suggests that extra-textual sources may be consulted even if the
text is not ambiguous."
4. Intent in Multi-party Contracts
Determining the intent of parties to any contract is difficult, but it is
even more difficult in multi-party contracts. This endeavor is further
complicated by the fact that the intent-to-benefit test in the Second
Restatement does not clarify whose intent should govern-the intent of the
promisor, the intent of the promisee, or the mutual intent of the parties.'
4 1
140 See, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 383 (7th Cir. 2005) ("In the area of statutory
construction, it is the intent of Congress that governs whether a private action exists."), withdrawn and
superceded by 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. 516 U.S. 217, 226
(1996) ("Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, but also an
agreement among sovereign powers, [this Court has] traditionally considered as aids to its
interpretation the negotiating and drafting history ... and the postratification understanding of the
contracting parties.") (citation omitted). See also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 160 (2003) (noting that in interpreting a treaty, "a US court follows a similar approach to
that which it adopts for the interpretation of legislation, where the 'legislative history' may be
examined in depth.").
141 David Bederman, CLASSICAL CANONS: RHETORIC, CLASSICISM AND TREATY
INTERPRETATION 267-68 (2001) [hereinafter CLASSICAL CANONS].
42 See discussion supra Part .
143 See discussion supra Part I.
144 See discussion supra Part III.
145 Summers, supra note 101, at 894-96 ("The Restatement Second ... may, in fact, add to the
confusion. It does not clearly indicate whether the promisee's intention alone should govern, or
whether courts must require the intention of both the promisor and the promisee before the third party
is an 'intended' beneficiary. The confusion stems from ambiguity in the language of section 302. In
its two-part test for determining when a third party is an 'intended beneficiary,' section 302(1) refers
to the 'intention of the parties' under its first requirement, but only to the promisee's intention under
subsection b of its second requirement.").
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David Summers proposes that a party should be considered an intended
beneficiary as long as the promisee intended to benefit such third party and the
promisor assented.' 6 Summers' proposal can be broadened to apply to
multilateral treaties-the "intent" requirement of the intent-to-benefit test can
be satisfied so long as one signatory to the treaty indicated an intent to benefit
a third party (or class of third parties) and other parties assented (including by
means of failing to raise an objection during the drafting of the convention).
Based on the discussion above, the intent-to-benefit test, adopted for
purposes of determining whether a treaty gives an individual the right to
enforce it, is as follows:
1) Does the treaty identify a class of individuals who is
intended to be benefited by it?
a. Travaux preparatoires may be consulted in answering the
question regardless of whether the text of the treaty is
ambiguous and should be privileged over other extra-
textual sources.
b. If one party made a statement during the drafting process
of the treaty which was not refuted by another party, that
statement should be considered the intent of all of the
parties for purposes of determining the meaning of a
treaty.
2) Is the individual within the class of people that the parties
intended to benefit?
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING INTENTIONALISM FROM CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION INSTEAD OF TEXTUALISM FROM STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING INDIVIDUALLY ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
UNDER TREATIES
Intentionalism, the theory underlying third party beneficiary rights in
contract law, should replace the more common textualist approach from
statutory interpretation in determining whether a treaty gives rise to
individually enforceable rights. Three general grounds-two positive and one
negative-support this view. First, treaty enforcement closely parallels non-
party contract enforcement, yet it diverges considerably from individual
statutory enforcement. The explanation for this is quite simple: treaties bear
greater structural similarities to contracts than they do to statutes. Thus, treaty
interpretation can benefit from favoring interpretive theories from contract law
over theories grounded in statutory interpretation. Second, the Constitution
and the Supreme Court interpretations thereof support the notion that treaties
are contracts, even though they have the effect of statutes. Third, rationales
146 Id. at 897.
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supporting a textualist approach to determining private rights of action in
statutes do not translate into the context of treaty interpretation.
A. Treaties as Contracts
1. Structural Similarities Between Treaties and Contracts
David Bederman points out that "[m]ost of the confusion over
essential principles in treaty interpretation has to do with whether international
agreements are more like contracts than legislation or whether they are
something altogether sui generis.""7 Canons of interpretation take into account
the characteristics of the document they are meant to interpret. The structure
of treaties generally parallels that of contracts, but diverges considerably from
the structure of statutes. Since the question of non-party enforcement in
treaties is structurally similar to that in contracts, and so structurally different
from the private rights of action question under statutes, courts should apply
the prevailing interpretive rule developed for contracts' 8  to treaty
interpretation.
As the chart below illustrates, treaties are virtually identical to
contracts in their drafting, negotiation, approval, and amendment processes.
Both treaties and contracts have signatories whereas statutes do not. Treaties
and contracts bind their signatories, while statutes bind people within their
jurisdiction. The Treaty Convention itself supports the view that treaties are
fundamentally similar to contracts, defining a treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation."'' 49 Statutes, on the
other hand, are negotiated, approved, and may be repealed or superseded by a
majority of the relevant legislative body. Treaties differ from contracts in their
potential enforcement mechanisms. While contracts are normally only
enforceable in domestic courts, treaties may be enforceable in international
tribunals if the parties thereto accede to the jurisdiction of the international
tribunal. ,'0
Chart 1: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Contracts, Treaties, and Statutes
Contracts Treaties Statutes
Signatories Signatories are Signatories are There are no
147 Bederman, supra note 72, at 963.
48 The use of "contract" herein refers to written contracts.
149 Treaty Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(a).
'50 For example, U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 30, 1, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 112 Stat. 2681, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, provides that any party to the treaty can bring a claim against another party in the
International Court of Justice if any dispute between them cannot be resolved through negotiations.
However, state parties may opt-out of that provision. Id. art. 20, 1 2.
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151 Although article 9(2) of the Treaty Convention provides that "[t]he adoption of the text of a
treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States present and
voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule," a State is not bound by
a treaty unless it expresses its intent to be bound. Treaty Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2). See id.
art. 11 ("The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other
means if so agreed.").
152 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 14-15 (John Jay) (E.G. Bourne ed., 1937) ("[B]ut still let us
not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and
consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so it must ever
afterwards be to alter or cancel them.").
153 See AUST, supra note 140, at 131 ("When a treaty has entered into force, it is in force only for
those states which have consented to be bound by it. A treaty therefore is not like national legislation,
which, once in force, is in force for all to whom it is directed. A treaty is much closer in character to a
contract."). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations which have the force of law .... They are
not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and
sovereign.").
Contracts Treaties Statutes
parties parties signatories to a
statute
Structure The provisions reflect The provisions The provisions are
agreements among reflect agreements intended to govern
the parties to do or among the parties to people within the
abstain from doing do or abstain from applicable
certain things doing certain things jurisdiction
Drafting & The parties negotiate The parties The applicable
Negotiation and draft it negotiate and draft it legislators negotiate,
and their staff drafts
it
Approval Approved by all Approved by all Approved by a
parties thereto parties thereto 151 majority of the
applicable
legislature
Amendment May be amended by May be amended by May be amended by
consent of all the consent of all the a majority of the152
parties parties applicable legis-
lature
Parties Only signatories are Signatories are People or entities
Bound bound by it bound by it and within the relevant
possibly also non- jurisdiction are
signatories that are bound by it
154
mentioned in the
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Contracts Treaties Statutes
treaty
Enforcement Contracts are Treaties may be Statutes are
enforceable in enforceable in typically only
domestic courts domestic courts as enforceable in the
well as international domestic courts
courts if the treaty
parties have granted
jurisdiction to such
international courts
2. Response to Arguments that Treaties Are Sui Generis
Alex Glashausser argues that treaties are neither contracts nor statutes,
but sui generis.'" First, Glashausser notes that a treaty, unlike a statute, has
diplomatic purposes: "it is a symbol of the bond between countries.""' While
it is true that some treaties may only have diplomatic purposes, many treaties
manifest binding agreements-such as delineating boundaries, agreements on
trade tariffs, or the treaties relating to the rights of individuals. Second,
Glashausser argues that treaties differ from contracts because the bargaining
power of parties to a treaty may be unequal,'57 people who negotiate treaties
come from different cultures, 5 8 and words are difficult to translate across
languages.'59 While all of these characteristics distinguish treaties from very
standard contracts, many sophisticated cross-border commercial contracts
share the same characteristics as treaties-the bargaining power among the
parties may be unequal, and they may be negotiated by parties who speak
different languages and come from different cultures.
Third, Glashausser argues that, despite their outward expressions of
support, States-unlike parties to contracts, who are generally more likely to
intend to comply with the contract when they enter into it-may not intend to
be bound by the treaties they sign.'"' Even if it is true that some parties enter
into treaties with no intention of complying with them, courts do not and
154 See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 113, at 1175 ("A statute is not a private agreement that binds
only the legislators who enact it, but a public document that establishes rules of conduct for people
outside the legislature-rules those people must follow, in many instances, on pain of fine or
imprisonment.").
155 Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When it is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U.
IN. L. REv. 1243, 1246-1247 (2005) ("In these pages, I attempt to set out an interpretive framework,
from the perspective of U.S. jurisprudence, that takes international agreements-which I will
generally refer to as 'treaties,' in the broad sense of that term seriously as a unique genre of
document.").
156Id. at 1271.
157Id. at 1272-73.
158 Id. at 1280-82.
159 Id. at 1277-78.
1
6
0Id. at 1288.
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should not hold such parties less accountable for their promises than parties to
contracts. To do so would contravene the rule of law.
In proposing interpretative norms for treaties that blend statutory
norms and contractual norms, James Wolf also considers treaties as sui
generis.' 6 ' He argues that treaties are similar to statutes because they are
primary rules-laws that have been affirmed by the legislative sovereign and
whose validity relies on rules of recognition such as the Constitution. '
Conversely, treaties are like contracts because they confer rights and impose
duties on the nations party to them.'63 Wolf argues that treaties diverge from
contracts mainly because treaties require no consideration to be valid." Wolf,
however, is incorrect in concluding that treaties have no consideration. Indeed,
treaties do have consideration in the broad sense of the term.
Consideration in the broad sense "cover[s] all the reasons deemed
sufficient to render a promise enforceable," while a narrow conception of the
term singles out "one reason deemed sufficient for enforcement of promises:
the bargained-for exchange." 65  Although there may be no formal requirement
in international law that a treaty manifest a bargained-for exchange, there are
other formal requirements necessary to make a treaty valid and enforceable.
Indeed, the Treaty Convention states that the parties to a treaty must have the
capacity and full powers to enter into a treaty,' 66 must consent to be bound by
the treaty,16 and that treaties may be invalidated for reasons such as fraud,' 8
error, 169 or duress.,7" Thus, the requirements for the validity and enforceability
of a treaty are consistent with the broad definition of consideration.
B. Treaties Are Like Contracts That Have the Effect of Statutes
Many courts probably handle treaties similarly to statutes because the
Constitution confers the same authority to treaties and statutes-both are
considered the "law of the land."' 7' However, even though the Constitution
indicates that treaties should have the effect of statutes, Supreme Court
jurisprudence supports the position that treaties should be interpreted as
161 James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1023, 1057 (1988).
162Id. at 1031.
163 Id. at 1052-53.
1 Id. at 1053.
165 See 2 ARTHUR CORBIN, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 5.1 (1995). Consideration in the narrow sense serves primarily to prevent donative
promises from being enforced. See id., § 5.2.
166 Treaty Convention, supra note 2, arts. 6, 7.
167 Id. arts. 12-15.
168 Id. art. 49.
169 Id. art. 48.
170 Id. arts. 50-52.
171 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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contracts. For example, in The Diamond Rings, Justice Brown's concurrence
clearly identified a treaty as a contract by calling it "an agreement, league or
contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, formally signed by
commissioners properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the sovereigns or
the supreme power of each state."'72  The Court further stated that "[i]n its
essence [a treaty] is a contract. It differs from an ordinary contract only in
being an agreement between independent states instead of private parties."'7 3
More recently, the Court in Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n," noted that "[a] treaty . . . is essentially a contract
between two sovereign nations." 75
While some courts have clearly stated that a treaty is a contract, other
courts have created rules to give treaties the effect of statutes. First, courts
have invalidated state laws that they deem to be inconsistent with treaties,
giving treaties the effect of federal statutes. 7 6 Second, courts have found that,
as with statutes, a later-in-time statute can trump a treaty.'77 Finally, the
Supreme Court created the Charming Betsy principle, a canon of interpretation
that calls for U.S. statutes to be interpreted in harmony with treaties to which
the United States is a party, which elevates a treaty to the status of a statute.'78
Even though treaties have the effect of statutes, the Constitution
distinguishes them from federal legislation in several important ways. First,
the House of Representatives does not play a role in the approval of a treaty, as
it would in the statutory ratification process."' Second, while the Senate can
modify a statute that it enacts, the Senate can only approve or disapprove of a
treaty and cannot change it.'8" Third, the President negotiates and enters into
treaties while Congress enacts statutes. 8'
The Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations thereof reflect the
dual character of treaties in our democratic system. Treaties have the effect of
172 183 U.S. at 185 (Brown, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
173 Id.
174 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
175 Id. at 675. See also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("As treaties are contracts
between independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning 'as understood in
the public law of nations."' (citing De Geofroy, 133 U. S. at 271)); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,
581 (1832) (stating that a treaty "is a compact between two nations or communities having the right of
self-government"); Harris v. United States, 768 F.2d 1240, 1242 (1lth Cir. 1985) vacated, 479 U.S.
957 (1986) ("International agreements should be construed more like contracts than statutes.").
176 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324(1937); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). See also AUST, supra note 140, at 158.
177 See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1947); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide &
Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 161 (1934); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
597-99 (1884).
178 Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains .... ).
See also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 130-32 (2005); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877) (all applying the Charming
Betsy principle).
179 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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statutes, but are recognized to be characteristically similar to contracts. The
characteristics of a document and not its effect should guide what interpretive
principles courts apply. The Constitution and interpretations thereof confirm
that a treaty is a contract. Consequently, it is more appropriate to apply
modem contract theories, rather than theories emanating from statutory
interpretation, to treaty interpretation.
C. Justifications for Textualism in Statutory Interpretation Are Not Applicable
in the Treaty Interpretation Context
Textualists offer a number of reasons to justify textualism in the
context of determining whether a statute gives rise to a private right of action.
However, none of those reasons apply for purposes of determining whether a
treaty creates individually enforceable rights. First, textualists argue that
courts usurp legislative powers when they imply private rights of actions in
statutes. Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon is emblematic of this view.'82 He
argued that, under Article III of the Constitution, Congress has the power to
determine the jurisdiction of courts and that implying a private cause of action
"extends [the court's] authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned
it to resolve.""1 3 Others have pointed out that, by implying private rights of
action in statutes, courts are "likely to invade the legislative function" by
creating remedies that Congress has not provided.' 4 Yet others argue that
"legislature[s] [are] better able than the courts to assess the costs and benefits
of [enforcing a statute] and to fine-tune levels of compliance with the
statute."'85
However, in interpreting treaties, courts do not intervene on
congressional powers.,8' Unlike with statutes, the President, and not Congress,
has the power to "make treaties" under the Constitution.' 7 Moreover, the
President may even terminate the United States' participation in a treaty
without consulting the Senate.' 8 The Senate only has the limited power to
accept or reject a treaty.8 9 This power is vastly different from its power to
formulate and adopt statutes.'9° Thus, when courts interpret treaties to imply
182 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3Id. at 746.
1 Stabile, supra note 41, at 884.
85 Id. at 882.
186 Bederman, supra note 72, at 1022 (noting that the statutory interpretation debate is
"preoccupied with the balance of power between judges and legislatures," and that "[t]his concern is
simply irrelevant in the treaty sphere").
187 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1305, 1309 (2002) ("Unlike the authority to enact legislation, the treaty
power as a whole is located in Article II of the Constitution, which indicates that it ought to be
regarded as an exclusively executive power. Although the Senate plays a role in providing its advice
and consent, there are several reasons that this exception to the President's general power over treaties
should be read narrowly.").
8Id. at 1310.
189 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
190 Yoo, supra note 187, at 1309 ("The Senate's participation, however, does not transform the
treaty power into a quasi-legislative power so much as it represents the dilution of the unitary nature
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individually enforceable rights, they are not usurping the constitutional powers
of the Senate.
In addition, courts do not infringe on inherent executive constitutional
powers in determining that a treaty gives rise to individually enforceable
rights. While the President has the authority to enter into a treaty, '9' he does
not necessarily have the constitutional authority to determine whether it may
be enforced by treaty beneficiaries in U.S. courts. As discussed above, it is
Congress that has the right to determine the jurisdiction of Article III courts
and not the Executive.'92 Thus, even if arguably Article III courts impinge on
Congressional authority in implying rights of actions in statutes, they do not
interfere with inherent executive authority in the same way when they
determine that treaties give rise to individually enforceable rights.
Second, others argue that, in implying private rights of action in
statutes, Article III courts infringe upon powers delegated by Congress to the
Executive. Congress has delegated the enforcement of certain statutes to
executive agencies. When courts imply private rights of action in those
statutes, some argue that the courts invade the discretion of the Executive
about what actions should be enforced. 93 However, that same argument does
not apply in the context of treaty interpretation. Because Congress has the
power to make statutes under the Constitution, it has the correlative power to
delegate enforcement of statutes to the Executive. However, Congress does
not have the power to make treaties, and therefore it has no power to delegate
enforcement of treaties to executive agencies. Consequently, when a court
determines that a treaty creates individually enforceable rights, it is not
usurping any powers delegated by Congress to the Executive.
Third, some textualists argue that it is futile to use extra-textual
sources to determine intent, because it is "impossible to find a single intent
within a large collective body such as Congress."' 9 Others argue that even if
legislative history provides insight into intent, it should not be used because it
would not provide the view of Congress collectively, only the views of
individual representatives. ' While it may not be possible to determine the
intent of a legislature that adopted a statute, it might be possible to determine
the intent of the parties to a treaty. Statutes only require that a majority vote in
favor of approving legislation, while treaties require unanimous approval by all
treaty parties.' Therefore, it would be more appropriate to find a shared intent
among the parties to a treaty than the members of a legislature.
of the executive branch, just as the inclusion of the presidential veto over legislation does not
undermine the fundamentally legislative nature of the Article I, Section 8 powers.").
191 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
192 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
193 Stabile, supra note 41, at 882-83.
194 Mank, supra note 30, at 824.
195Roman, supra note 31, at 386.
196 Bederman, supra note 72, at 1022.
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V. APPLICATION OF THE INTENT-TO-BENEFIT TEST TO DETERMINING
INDIVIDUALLY ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS UNDER TREATIES: THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS.
A. The Sanchez-Llamas Case and the Circuit Split
Courts lack uniform standards in adjudicating whether a treaty
provides individually enforceable rights. As a result, they also lack principled
ways to distinguish which extra-textual sources should be given more credence
than others in determining the meaning of a treaty. The Supreme Court in
Sanchez-Llamas, while it had the opportunity to do so, failed to provide courts
with such guidance. By framing the issue as two separate questions-first,
whether the treaty creates individual rights, and second, whether it creates the
remedies that the petitioners were seeking" 7-the Court concluded that it did
not need to address whether the treaty creates rights since it found that the
treaty does not entitle the petitioners to the specific remedies they sought. 
98
On the other hand, a four-Justice dissent in Sanchez-Llamas concluded
that the Consular Convention creates individually enforceable rights.' The
dissent outlined the following methodology for determining whether a treaty
provides for individually enforceable rights: First, does the treaty "prescribe a
rule by which the rights of the private citizen ...may be determined" and
second, are "the obligations set forth in [the treaty] of a nature to be enforced
in a court of justice.""
Despite the apparent clarity of the methodology articulated by the
dissent, the weakness of the test became apparent when the Court applied it to
the Consular Convention. Instead of having a focused rationale, the dissent
concluded that the Consular Convention gives rise to individually enforceable
rights on the basis of numerous factors: first, the "nature" of the Consular
Convention;2 ' second, the "rights" language in the Convention; °2 third, the
position of the government that other provisions of the Consular Convention
give rise to individually-enforceable rights;. 3 and fourth, findings by the
Supreme Court that other treaties have given rise to individually enforceable
rights."
After Sanchez-Llamas, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have come to
diverging opinions on whether the Consular Convention creates individual
rights that can be enforced through a Section 1983 civil damages action against
197 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677-78.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 2690-2709 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing HeadMoney Cases, 112 U.S. 580).
200 Id.
201 Id.
20
2 Id.
203 Id. at 2696.
204 Id.
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law enforcement officials."5 While the Seventh Circuit found that Article 36 of
the Consular Convention created individual rights that could be enforced
through Section 1983,6 the Ninth Circuit found that the Consular Convention
does not create individual rights that can be enforced through that statute.2 7 In
reaching the diverging results on the same issue, the courts applied two
different standards and privileged different extra-textual sources. "'
The Seventh Circuit's test for determining whether a treaty gives rise
to individually enforceable rights enforceable through Section 1983 included
two factors: "(1) [W]hether the [treaty] by its terms grants private rights to any
identifiable class, and (2) whether the text of the [treaty] is phrased in terms of
the persons benefited."2 o9 The court then concluded that "Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention by its terms grants private rights to an identifiable class of
persons-aliens from countries that are parties to the Convention who are in
the United States-and that its text is phrased in terms of the person
benefited." 0
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in denying that Section 1983 can
be used to enforce Consular Convention violations, characterized the issue as
"whether Congress, by ratifying the [Consular] Convention, intended to create
private rights and remedies enforceable in American courts through Section
1983 by individual foreign nationals who are arrested or detained in this
country.""' Based on a textual reading of the Consular Convention, the court
concluded that Article 36 does not create judicially enforceable individual
rights, because it does not unambiguously create such rights. 2
In reaching their findings, both circuit courts privileged different extra-
textual sources. The Seventh Circuit referred extensively to the treaty's
drafting history.2 3 While the Ninth Circuit explicitly refused to do so"4 and
205 Compare Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616 (finding that the Consular Convention
cannnot be enforced through a Section 1983 action) with Jogi, 480 F.3d 822 (finding that the Consular
Convention can be enforced through a Section 1983 action).
206 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 829.
207 Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at *2.
208 At the heart of the matter is a fundamental disagreement between the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits about the holding in Gonzaga 536 U.S. 273. In Gonzaga, the Supreme Court decided that the
statute that the petitioner was seeking to enforce could not be enforced through Section 1983.
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. The Seventh Circuit views Gonzaga as only requiring that the statute or
treaty which the litigant is seeking to enforce be phrased in terms of the person benefited. Jogi, 480
F.3d at 827-828. Once it is determined that the statute confers an individual right, it is presumptively
enforceable through a Section 1983 action. Id. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit states that
"[w]hile Article 36 may also benefit an individual detainee when properly followed, benefit is not
enough to pass the Gonzaga test." Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at *30. The dissent in the
Ninth Circuit case supports the Seventh Circuit reading of Gonzaga to require only a determination
that the Consular Convention "was intended to confer individual rights" and once it was determined
that the treaty confers rights, such rights "would be presumptively enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983."
Id. at *58-59.
209 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 829.
210 Id. at 836.
21 Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at *8.
212 Id. at *18-19.
213 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 829-30, 833-35.
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instead cited the "contemporaneous understanding of Congress in ratifying [the
treaty] as well as the view of the Department of State, and the uniform practice
of States in implementing it over the years" to "buttress" its view. "
Thus, the dissenting opinion in Sanchez-Llamas, the Ninth Circuit
case, and the Seventh Circuit case each applied a different test to determining
individually enforceable rights in treaties, used differing interpretive theories
from textual to intentionalist,26 and consulted different sources in reaching
their opinion. "'
B. The Modified Intent-to-Benefit Test and the Consular Convention
The modified intent-to-benefit test provides a predictable and uniform
methodology to assist courts in determining whether a treaty creates
individually enforceable rights. In addition, it also provides courts with
guidance on the source that should be privileged in interpreting the treaty. The
test is based on a contract law approach, which is appropriate to use in
determining individually enforceable rights in treaties for the reasons discussed
in Part IV above. The contract approach takes into account modem principles
that acknowledge that sometimes parties to contracts undertake their
obligations intending to benefit non-parties. Under the test, courts must
determine whether 1) the treaty in question identifies a class of individuals
who are intended to be benefited by it and 2) the individual attempting to
enforce the treaty is within such class."8 In applying the test, courts should
give greater credence to the drafting history of the treaty rather than other
extra-textual sources, because it is this source that provides insight into the
I241d. at *28 ("Given that Article 36 does not unambiguously confer a right in individual
detainees to support a cause of action under Section 1983, we see no need for resort to the travaux
pr6paratoires (citing the Treaty Convention).").
215 Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at *19. It appears that the Court required that the
Convention specific state that its "creates privately enforceable rights." Id. at *22 ("Comejo suggests
that the proviso in paragraph 2 manifests an intent to create privately enforceable rights. Nowhere
does it say so.").
216 See also supra Part II above discussing the textualist methodology employed by the Sanchez-
Llamas majority opinion.
217 The party briefs in Sanchez-Llamas also reflect the lack of clear standards on this issue. Brief
of Petitioner Mario A. Bustillo at 16-34, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 05-
51) [hereinafter Bustillo Brief] (arguing that that the Vienna Convention creates individual rights on
the basis of its text, its travaux pr~paratoires, United States' post-ratification conduct, post-ratification
conduct of other signatories and opinions of the ICJ); Brief of Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at
14-27, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566) [hereinafter Moises' Brief]
(arguing that Article 36 creates individual rights because of the ordinary meaning of the provision, the
purpose of the Consular Convention, the travaux preparatoires of the Consular Convention, the
contemporaneous view and subsequent practice of the United States, and the ICJ opinions); Brief of
the Respondent at 10-19, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 05-51) [hereinafter
Virginia Brief] (arguing that the Consular Convention does not create individual rights because of the
text of the Consular Convention, the interpretation given to it by the Executive, the ratification history
of the Consular Convention, and the fact that other nations have not interpreted it to provide for
individual rights); Brief of Respondent State of Oregon at 10-37, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566) [hereinafter Oregon Brief] (arguing that the Consular Convention
does not create individual rights because of its plain text, its negotiation history, its ratification history,
the executive's interpretation, and the interpretation of other parties).
218 See discussion and modified intent-to-benefit test supra Part III.
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shared intent of the parties.2 9 Application of the modified intent-to-benefit test
to the facts of Sanchez-Llamas as well as to the facts of the Ninth and Seventh
Circuit cases suggests that the Consular Convention gives petitioners and
appellants in those cases both rights and remedies.22
1. Does the Treaty Identify a Class of Individuals who are Intended to be
Benefited by It?
Article 36 of the Consular Convention identifies a class of individuals
that is to benefit from the Consular Convention-individuals of one nation
detained by authorities of another national government. Article 36 states that if
"he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner."2 ' In addition to requiring a
detaining authority to notify the national government of the detainee if he or
she so requests, the Consular Convention places an affirmative obligation on
the detaining authority to notify the detainee of his "rights" under the Consular
Convention. Article 36(l)(b) further states that "[t]he said authorities shall
inform the person concerned [i.e., the detainee] without delay of his rights
under this sub-paragraph.
, 22 2
On the other hand, courts have noted that the language of the preamble
of the Consular Convention, which states that the "purpose of such privileges
and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective
States,2 23 weighs against concluding that the Consular Convention was meant
to benefit individuals. 22 Although the intent-to-benefit test does not require
ambiguity in the meaning of the relevant treaty provisions before consulting
with extra-textual sources, referring to extra-textual sources is even more
compelling when there is ambiguity. 25 The contract law approach suggests
consulting with the travaux preparatories, also known as the drafting history,
in determining the meaning of treaty provisions.
i. Consulting with Travaux Preparatories
219 See supra Part III.B.
220 See infra Parts V.B.2-3.
2 See Consular Convention, supra note 15, art. 36(1)(b).
222 Id.
2 Id. pmbl.
224 See, e.g., Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at *13; United States v. Emuegbunam, 268
F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001).
225 See, e.g., Treaty Convention, supra note 2, art. 32.
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The drafting history, and the committee and plenary debates,226
surrounding the adoption of Article 36 demonstrate the intent of the delegates
to protect the rights of individuals. 227 The negotiators at the conference
extensively discussed the rights of foreign nationals."8  For example, the
Australian delegate stated that "there was no need to stress the extreme
importance of not disregarding, in the present or any other international
document, the rights of the individual., 29 The U.S. delegate proposed an
amendment to Article 36(l)(b) requiring consular notification to be made at the
request of the national, "to protect the rights of the national concerned."23 The
United Kingdom delegate submitted the amendment that became the final
version of paragraph (1)(b), requiring the detaining nation to inform the
detained foreign national of his right to consular access. The U.S. delegate
voted with the majority in favor of the amendment.23' On the other hand,
Venezuela proposed an amendment that would have eliminated the individual
right of consular communication, but it was withdrawn after receiving strong
opposition from other member states.232
ii. Determining Intent in Multi-party Contracts
The modified intent-to-benefit test suggests that if a party voiced a
position and the other party or parties did not challenge or object to it, that
view constitutes the shared intent of the parties.2" Although the Conference
extensively debated various terms of Article 36, the view that its language
operated to confer rights on individual foreign nationals was widely voiced by
delegates and that view went unchallenged. For example, Spain's delegate
observed that "[t]he right of the nationals of a sending State to communicate
with and have access to the consulate and consular officials of their own
226 In 1963, ninety-two nations convened to negotiate the text of the Consular Convention. Mark
Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 612 (1997).
227 At least one other author has argued that the Consular Convention should be interpreted to
give rise to individually enforceable rights principally because of its drafting history, but did not
provide a contract law methodology to justify his conclusion. See Brittany P. Whitesell, Note,
Diamond in the Rough: Mining Article 36()(B) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations for
an Individual Right to Due Process, 54 DUKE L.J. 587, 618 (2004) ("As a self-executing treaty, the
Vienna Convention is capable of granting individual rights, and the treaty's language and drafting
history indicate that it does so. The treaty explicitly references an individual, and the drafting history
indicates that the drafters intended to vest an individual right in foreign nationals.").
228 See 1 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OFFICIAL RECORDS at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 25/6, (1963) [hereinafter CONSULAR RELATIONS CONFERENCE OFFICIAL
RECORDS].
229 Id. 34, at 331.
230 Id. 39, at 337.
231 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS WITH OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, S. EXEC.
DOC. No. 91 -I, at 60 (1969) (Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference
on Consular Relations).
232 CONSULAR RELATIONS CONFERENCE OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 228, at 37, 38, 84, 85,
331-34.
233 See supra Part IV.B.
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country ... [i]s one of the most sacred rights of foreign residents in a
country.""2 '  The delegate from India emphasized that "the right given to
consulates implied a corresponding right for nationals. 235 The South Korean
delegate stated that "the receiving State's obligation under [Article 36(1)(b)]
was extremely important, because it related to one of the fundamental and
indispensable rights of the individual. 236 Consequently, the drafting history
suggests that the treaty signatories intended to benefit an identifiable class of
individuals."'
2. Are the Individuals Within the Class of People that the Parties Intended to
Benefit?
The class of individuals that benefit from the Consular Convention is
composed of citizens of a State party to the Consular Convention who are
detained by authorities of another State that is also party to the Convention.3
U.S. government officials detained both the petitioners in the Sanchez-Llamas
case and the appellants in the Ninth and Seventh Circuits, yet failed to notify
either of their right to contact the consulates of his country. 39 Thus, both are
within the class of individuals that are to be benefited by the Consular
Convention.
3. Rights and Remedies
Under the intent-to-benefit approach, in order to enforce a contract a
litigant must show that a right exists, but there is no requirement that the
contract also specify a remedy. 4 On the other hand, the majority opinion in
Sanchez-Llamas held that a treaty must not only specify that the individual has
rights under it but also that it give rise to the specific remedies sought by the
234 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963, 2d Comm., 15th mtg., 36, at
332, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16 (emphasis added).
235Id. $ 50, at 333 (emphasis added).
236 Id. 1, at 338 (emphasis added).
237On the other hand, the Government in Sanchez-Llamas argued that the drafting history does
not give rise to individually enforceable rights, because no delegate ever mentioned that individuals
would have the right to raise it as a defense in a domestic criminal proceeding. Oregon Brief, supra
note 217, at 15. In reliance on statutory interpretation models, the respondents framed the question
incorrectly-the correct question is whether the drafting history indicates an intent-to-benefit certain
individuals, not whether the signatories intended to given individuals enforceable rights under the
treaty. Respondents also frame individual rights test in statutory language and rejects the contract law
approach by stating that "the proper question is not whether the delegates were aware that individuals
would benefit from the obligations undertaken by the signatory states. Rather, the question is whether
the parties negotiating the convention intended to create a right that an individual detainee could
enforce against the receiving state." Id. at 20. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of The Association of the
Bar of The City of New York in Support of Petitioners at 7, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51) (arguing that "[t]o decide whether Article 36 of the Convention
creates individual rights, this Court engages in an analysis similar to statutory interpretation").
238 See supra Part V.B. 1.
239Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2676; Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616 at *3; Jogi, 480
F.3d at 826.
240 See supra Part III.B.
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petitioner.21' In the two circuit civil cases, the courts did not deal with the issue
of whether or not the Consular Convention creates remedies, because an
existing U.S. statute, Section 1983,22 supplied the remedy.4 3
However, most courts that have addressed the issue in the criminal
context have found that the Consular Convention does not give rise to any
remedies. 4  One explanation for this may be that courts are less troubled by
providing monetary damages as a civil remedy than by freeing someone who
may have committed a crime. More importantly, though, unlike in the civil
context where Section 1983 supplies the remedy, courts probably do not find
remedies in the criminal context, because litigants who are challenging their
criminal convictions have not cited a U.S. statute that explicitly supplies them
the remedy for Consular Convention violations.
There is no principled doctrinal justification for why a violation of
individual rights in a treaty should be enforced in a civil context, but not in a
criminal context. The modified intent-to-benefit approach does not suffer from
this shortcoming, because it does not require that the treaty need to specify
both rights and remedies. Under the test, once it is determined that the
individual is an intended beneficiary, courts would have to find some effective
remedy for the violation of rights.
CONCLUSION
This article provides a methodology for adjudicating an issue that has
been increasingly raised in U.S. courts-whether a treaty gives rise to
individually enforceable rights. That question, at least with respect to the
Consular Convention, was left unresolved by the Supreme Court last term in
Sanchez-Lllamas. The Supreme Court's failure to provide guidance on the
issue has left room for courts to reach differing conclusions. This article
attempts to provide a predictable set of guidelines for courts to use in
determining whether an individual may enforce a treaty in U.S. courts.
When determining whether a treaty gives rise to individually
enforceable rights, courts should apply a modified version of the intentionalist
intent-to-benefit test from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. An
approach to determining individually enforceable rights rooted in contract law
is the appropriate methodology, because it recognizes that treaties are
essentially contracts between nations. Courts, however, have incorrectly
imported principles of textual statutory interpretation to determining
individually enforceable rights under treaties. The traditional arguments in
favor of a textualist approach to private rights of action in statutes do not
241 The dissent, however, cited to the language of the treaty that indicates that States must give it
"full effect" to show that courts must provide remedies for violations of individual rights under a
treaty. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2698 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242 42 U.S.C. §1983.
243 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2676; Cornejo, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616 at *1; Jogi, 480
F.3d at 825.
24 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 831-32 (citing a number of circuit cases where courts have concluded that
the Consular Convention does not provide remedies to criminal defendants).
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translate into the treaty interpretation context. Consequently, the theory
underlying modem statutory interpretation, textualism, should be rejected in
favor of the theory guiding the intent-to-benefit test-intentionalism.
Application of the modified intent-to-benefit test suggested by this
article is more likely than the statutory approach to lead courts to find that
certain treaties create rights in favor of certain individuals that are enforceable
by those individuals in a U.S. court. First, under the approach, in order for
someone to enforce a treaty in U.S. courts, the treaty does not need to
explicitly state that non-parties may bring a suit to enforce it, but rather it
requires courts to determine whether the treaty drafters intended to benefit such
party. Second, in order for an individual to enforce the treaty, the modified
intent-to-benefit test does not require that courts also find that the treaty text
provide for the exact remedy that the intended beneficiary is seeking. Finally,
it allows courts to consider extra-textual sources, which could confirm and/or
manifest the intent in the first instance to benefit certain third parties. Treaties
that affect the relationships between the individuals and nations, such as
human rights treaties and humanitarian law treaties, are more likely than other
types of treaties to give rise to individually enforceable rights under the
modified intent-to-benefit test, because such treaties are often intended to
benefit individuals.
Concerns that the intent-to-benefit test will open the floodgates to
litigation against the United States and other nations in U.S. courts are not
warranted for several reasons. First, claims of individually-enforceable rights
under treaties may only proceed if the treaty in question is found to be self-
executing.245 Yet in ratifying a number of human rights treaties, Congress
adopted a resolution indicating that such treaties are not "self-executing.
'246
Thus, the universe of treaties under which individuals could claim enforcement
rights in the United States is limited. Second, the intent-to-benefit test limits
enforceable rights in favor of only intended beneficiaries; incidental
beneficiaries, who may benefit indirectly, do not fall within the protected class
with enforceable rights and will not be able to enforce the contract.27  Indeed,
although courts have increasingly allowed non-parties to enforce contracts
between governmental entities and private parties on the basis of the third
party beneficiary rule,248 this has not led to a floodgate of litigation. Third,
many claims by individuals against foreign governments based in treaties are
245 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 827. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § Ill
cmt. h (1987).
246 See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self Executing
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 131-32 (1999). Some have
argued that this principle may be unconstitutional, but this debate is not engaged here. See, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988) (arguing that the
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is inconsistent with the Supremacy
Clause).
247 SECOND RESTATEMENT Section 315. See also id. § 302 cmt. a ("This Section distinguishes an
'intended' beneficiary, who acquires a right by virtue of a promise, from an 'incidental' beneficiary,
who does not."); id. § 302 introductory note ("the terms 'intended' beneficiary and 'incidental
beneficiary' are used to distinguish beneficiaries who have rights from those who do not.").
248 Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary
Rule, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1184-1191 (1985) (citing a number of cases in which courts have
granted third party beneficiary rights to individuals in government contracts).
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likely to be dismissed on procedural grounds. For example, cases against
foreign governments may be dismissed on grounds of a lack of personal
jurisdiction or on forum non conveniens grounds if the events in question
occurred in another country and/or witnesses or evidence are located in such
other country.
On the other hand, adopting a uniform test rooted in contract law
would enhance the goal of comity among nations. First, adopting a uniform
methodology would ensure that U.S. courts do not reach differing
interpretations of the same treaty. Currently, U.S. courts have diverged in their
interpretation of Article 36 of the Consular Convention. The modified intent-
to-benefit test provides a set of guidelines that can be applied by courts to
reach uniform results when determining whether a treaty gives rise to
individually enforceable rights. Inconsistent interpretations by U.S. courts of
treaty provisions undercut its relationships with other countries.
Second, adopting a methodology based in contract law would more
likely lead U.S. courts to interpret treaties consistently with foreign and
international courts. The Supreme Court's principle that opinions of foreign
courts deserve "respectful consideration" ' 9 reflects the understanding that
uniformity is an important goal of treaty interpretation.250 If treaties are viewed
as contracts, then U.S. courts would refer to the same body of extrinsic
information that foreign and international courts use in determining the
meaning of a treaty-the drafting history of the treaty. Referring to the same
body of extrinsic information would more likely create uniform interpretations.
In addition, viewing a treaty as a contract suggests that interpretations
placed by international and foreign courts should be given persuasive authority
in U.S. courts. For example, although principles of res judicata25' would
prevent two courts in the United States from reviewing the same contract
provision (unless one of the courts had appellate jurisdiction over the other
court), if two courts did review the same provision, the second court is likely to
consider and perhaps refer to the interpretation of the first court as persuasive
authority. Similarly, a U.S. court adjudicating the interpretation of a treaty
should consider a foreign or international court's interpretation as persuasive
authority. Doing so would more likely lead U.S. courts to adopt interpretations
of treaties that are more consistent with foreign and international courts. The
modified intent-to-benefit test provides a predictable set of guidelines for
courts in adjudicating an issue that currently lacks uniform standards.
249 See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 661 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct at 2700.
251 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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